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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a critical review of market power modelling in the electricity market. This research provides a coherent guideline to determine suitable 
modelling for market power in electricity market. This research also includes market power index application in competition policy enforcement. An 
ideal market power index is one which provides the most straightforward number to measure the market power exercise. However, a more sophisticated 
approach is needed to mitigate market power since traditional indexes have limitations in representing the complexity of the power system. Cournot 
modelling has the main weakness in large-scale power system modelling with transmission constraint. However, the Cournot model continues to 
develop as a tool to analyse player behaviour due to the analytical connectivity between a real power market and microeconomic engineering theory, 
e.g. DC load flow, reserve margin, transmission constraint, forward contract, demand elasticity, and RSI.
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1. MARKET POWER AND DESIGN IN 
ELECTRICITY MARKET
Market power is defined as the ability to alter prices away from 
competitive levels (Stoft 2002; Mas-Colell and Whinston 1995, 
383). The objective of the electricity operator is to secure demand 
whilst maintaining the efficient operation of the electricity system. 
However, market power has the capability to affect this goal 
adversely by withholding input, and thus leading to short-term 
supply shortages. Also, it could produce price signal distortion 
causing inaccurate generation dispatch and investment decision 
making. Market power is a major concern in electricity market 
restructuring. Wolak (2014) confirmed that a key lesson from 
decades of liberalisation or restructuring is that the prospect 
of costly market failure, often due to unilateral market power 
exercise, is much higher in the electricity industry than in other 
formerly regulated industries. As explained by Stoft (2002), there 
are incentives and opportunities to remove generation capacity 
from the market, through physical withholding (e.g. scheduling 
maintenance outages during peak demand or over-scheduling 
transmission lines to cause artificial congestion) or economic 
withholding (e.g. offering a high price to benefit the rest of the 
generation fleet or a financial position). The likely causes of market 
power exercise, as inferred by Joskow (2008), are the presence of 
transmission constraints, an excessive reliance on spot markets 
rather than forward contracts, the very low elasticity of demand, 
the lack of economical electricity storage, flaws in wholesale 
market design, exclusionary behaviour potentially arising from 
the vertical integration between transmission and generation, and 
limited demand participation in wholesale spot markets.
Electricity market design is a multi-stage process, where free-entry 
regulation and divestiture usually occurs as a step performed by 
electricity regulator to fix market failure that has occurred due to 
suboptimal electricity market design. As explained by Newbery 
(1998), entry in the UK duopoly electricity market has remained 
contestable and has reduced the market power of the network, 
with market power exercise itself caused by the inefficiencies 
of the generators and the non-competitive number of players. 
The highest market power decrease is more likely to occur in the 
change of market structure from monopoly to duopoly (Newbery, 
1998). The larger the number of players in the market, the more 
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competitive the electricity market will be. However, it is unrealistic 
to design a competitive wholesale market where a large number of 
players exists, considering the unlikelihood in creating an atomic 
electricity market (Joskow and Tirole 2005). Although the creation 
of market monitoring agencies could minimise the market power 
exercise, market mitigation could lead to a generation investment 
signal reduction in the long run (Joskow and Tirole 2005). Wilson 
(2002) described methods to limit market power in the electricity 
industry by breaking up a vertically integrated company, hedging 
through contract implementation for monopsony market, and 
establishing re-regulation in a case where market power exercise 
is predicted to occur in the market as in the California case.
Market power studies focused on post restructuring when market 
power arose dominate market power research especially in US 
and UK electricity market (Joskow, 2001; Borenstein et al., 
2002; Wolfram, 1999). The success of market restructuring in 
the electricity industry depends on how the market structure post 
restructuring affects market performance. A sound market design 
should provide sufficient competition for each type of power plant: 
Baseload, intermediate and peaking. Divestiture of the mid-merit 
power plant in the UK electricity market in 1994 is due to the 
lack of intermediate power plant competition. In contrast, nuclear 
power plants are considered competitive with other baseload power 
plants (Green 1996).
The objective of this research is to presents a critical review of 
market power modelling in electricity market and explores which 
market power index and modelling that suitable to represent 
the complexity of power system. This research expounds the 
advantages and disadvantages of market power indices and 
modelling. The main research contribution is to provide coherent 
guideline in market power assessment and assist policy makers 
in the modelling and mitigation of market power. This paper is 
structured into five sections as follows. Section 1 provides an 
overview of market power and market design in in electricity 
market. Section 2 explores the market power modelling in 
electricity market. Section 3 provides the list of market power 
indices in electricity market, including the traditional and 
sophisticated indices. Section 4 focuses on the implementation of 
market power index in competition policy enforcement. Finally, 
conclusion is provided in Section 5.
2. MARKET POWER MODELLING IN 
ELECTRICITY MARKET
There are numerous methods to represent electricity markets in a 
model. There are three types of electricity market modelling based 
on Ventosa et al. (2005) which are: (1) optimisation techniques 
for a single firm; (2) equilibrium models for multiple players in 
the market; and (3) simulation models. The optimisation models 
optimise a specific objective (usually profit) by considering 
specific techniques and economic constraints. The market price is 
exogenous if the market is in a perfect competition state. However, 
a firm can influence the market price in an imperfect market. 
Here, equilibrium models are considered the best techniques to 
analyse an electricity market with several players, especially in 
the imperfectly competitive market. Thus, the models have the 
capability to combine multiplayer behaviour. One difference 
with optimisation models, equilibrium models can address profit 
maximisation from multi players simultaneously. Simulation 
models are applied for more complex problems in the market, using 
specific rules and assumptions; thus, they represent multiplayer 
agent modelling. Among the equilibrium models reviewed here, 
the SFE model was determined as the most computationally 
demanding in comparison to other models (e.g. the Cournot and 
Bertrand models). However, the Cournot model continues to 
develop as a tool to analyse player behaviour due to the analytical 
connectivity between a real power market and microeconomic 
engineering theory, e.g. DC load flow, reserve margin, transmission 
constraint, forward contract, demand elasticity, and RSI.
In the restructured electricity market, GenCos submit their 
optimised strategic supply offer to maximise the profit. Thus, it is 
crucial to analyse the strategic behaviour of this bidding behaviour 
in an oligopoly market. Li et al. (2011) divided the bidding strategy 
analysis in the electricity spot market into four groups which are: 
Single player optimisation, game theory, agent-based and hybrid 
model. Single player optimisation could be modelled using a 
numerical programming, e.g. Mixed Integer, Non-Linear, and 
Dynamic Programming. In game theory, presenting a player’s 
strategic behaviour consists of Bertrand, Cournot and SFE 
modelling. The agent-based model is categorised based on learning 
algorithms such as model-based adaptation, genetic, Q-learning, 
computational learning and Ant-Colony optimisation. There is a 
chance that the system does not dispatch the supply offer from a 
particular generation company due to the competitive behaviour of 
other players, uncertain demand and power system pressure from 
renewable energy entry. The detail of the model’s representation 
in the supply behaviour is important since it needs to incorporate 
risks and constraints in the bidding and strategic behaviour.
The strategic interaction differentiation involving game theory 
and the industrial organisation concept, hence it depends on firm 
anticipation from other players regarding decisions on the price 
and quantities (Day et al. 2002). Day et al. (2002) classified 
the strategic interaction of firms into seven categories: (1) Pure 
competition/Bertrand: The decision variable of the firm is only of 
the quantity, and each firm simply accepts the fixed price. Hence, 
there is no market power in this strategic behaviour model (2) 
Generalised Bertrand strategy: Gaming in price, the strategic 
interaction is based on the price offered by the firm. (3) Cournot 
strategy: Gaming in quantity, the strategic interaction is based 
on the supply by the company. (4) Collusion: The strategic 
interaction is based on joint profit maximisation from colluding 
firms. (5) Stackelberg model: Defines a “leader” whose decision 
correctly takes into account the reaction of “followers”, who do 
not recognise how their reactions affect the leader’s decision. 
(6) Supply Function Equilibrium: The decision variable for 
each firm is the parameters of its bidding function. (7) General 
Conjectural Variations.
A monopoly is considered as the simplest example of market 
power where there is only one player (Mas-Colell and Michael, 
1995). Monopoly is not efficient in producing output since the 
market price is above the marginal cost. Oligopoly is another type 
of market where there are a few players, thus involving strategic 
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interaction between firms and choosing a profit-maximising output 
for itself. Oligopoly price is low, while the output is high, compared 
to Monopoly. Oligopoly is a type of market where the interaction 
is between several players. Static Oligopoly models only consider 
one strategic action and ignore repeated interactions over time 
between firms. In the Cournot equilibrium, profit maximisation 
is derived by setting a firm’s output. Hence, the market clearing 
price is a result of the output of the company and the competitors. 
The enterprise acknowledges the demand function before bidding 
the output to the market. Cournot produced a unique Nash 
equilibrium which is a straight outcome of price and quantity for a 
given demand function: The inefficiency in welfare maximisation 
also occurs in a Cournot market. The competitive industry is the 
industry that maximises utility minus cost while a monopoly only 
maximises profits. Thus, a Cournot market maximises these two 
objectives depending on the number of firms. If n increases, then 
more weight is given to the consumer surplus as compared to the 
producer surplus.
Transmission constraint lies at the heart of market power issues in 
a restructured electricity market. Borenstein et al. (2000) showed 
that a firm is less likely to have sufficient market power to increase 
electricity prices in the absence of transmission constraint, by 
implementing Cournot modelling for the California electricity 
market. The study concluded that transmission capacity expansion 
in an area suffering market power is significantly related to price 
decreases, energy consumption increases and deadweight losses 
minimisation. However, the model is a one-shot Nash equilibrium 
and could have different results with dynamic behaviour in the 
real market. Further, the model should provide a free entry in 
the dual market region, to replicate the competitive behaviour 
effect. Although the model only uses two markets to represent the 
complicated California electricity market, the analysis provides 
a broad insight into competitive behaviour with transmission 
constraints and social benefits provided by a transmission facility.
Another transmission-constrained Cournot study by Cunningham 
et al. (2002) evaluated three market players in a looped constrained 
network and a non-constant marginal cost. Dispatcher and power 
system planners have difficulties in performing Transmission 
Expansion Planning (TEP) since the strategic behaviour of the 
firm alters the electricity flow in the electrical system. Thus, it is 
crucial to implement specific congestion management protocols. 
The study by Cunningham et al. (2002) showed that transmission 
constraints could affect strategic behaviour although the non-
constraint equilibrium flow is less than the network limit. Cournot 
competition in a constrained network implies the importance of 
power system matching strategy (Willems 2002). In cases where 
the consumer has low bargaining power, e.g. low demand elasticity, 
the dispatchers could conduct a competition for transmission 
capacity to increase market competitiveness. Willems (2002) 
suggested that the power system operator should not tax the 
congestion rent of the generator, which in this case will lead to 
the players adapting their strategic behaviour to the transmission 
congestion.
The main challenge in Cournot oligopoly market formulation is to 
model GenCos strategic behaviour incorporating the transmission 
constraint. There are two approaches in modelling generator 
strategic behaviour according to their nature of transmission 
charges. The first approach is to assume that all generators do not 
have the capability to influence transmission rent. As such, the 
firms behave naively to accept the locational transmission prices. 
In this case, GenCos behave a la Bertrand and naively behave as 
a transmission price taker. The market operator charges GenCos 
that utilise the same network service with equivalent marginal 
valuation. This approach results in a convex formulation and 
is easy to solve. Furthermore, it is considered realistic in the 
real complex power system. In contrast, the Bertrand approach 
assumes that each generator could influence the transmission 
charge, i.e., the generators have market power in transmission 
congestions and fees by performing congesting and de-congesting 
transmission lines in the electrical system through generation 
capacity withholding (Hobbs and Udi 2003). The first approach 
results in an Equilibrium Problem with Equilibrium Constraint, 
which leads to multiple equilibrium prices and profits and a non-
convex problem. In contrast, the Bertrand approach leads to a more 
tractable analysis since the simulation has a single equilibrium 
result and a convex equation1.
The Cournot model takes quantities as a firm’s strategy while the 
Bertrand model of oligopoly takes price as a strategic variable. 
Assuming the products are homogeneous, and all companies 
have the same marginal cost, the competitive behaviour produces 
a condition where the price equals the marginal cost although 
there are only two players in the market. This is known as the 
Bertrand “paradox”. The Bertrand model is a one-shot game and 
not standard practice in the real market. The Bertrand model could 
be considered as sealed competitive bidding where the player 
bid’s the price once and then the game ends. Thus, the producer 
with the lowest bid gets the consumers. SFE has the capability 
to model the electricity market more realistically because SFE 
assumes the bidding-supply function from generator firms by 
incorporating demand uncertainty under an oligopoly market. 
Klemperer and Margaret (1989) performed the first study on this 
model while Green and Newbery (1992) applied the SFE model 
on England and Wales’s electricity pool. The SFEs application by 
Green and Newbery (1992) showed that the equilibrium price is 
above marginal cost, which implies high markup and substantial 
deadweight loss in the market. Green (1996) utilised linear SFE 
with asymmetric firms to analyse competition in England and 
Wales Pools. He found that splitting up the dominants leads to 
deadweight loss reduction.
Berry et al. (1999) studied the strategic behaviour of generators 
using SFE with two nodes and four nodes networks. From the 
study, it was found that transmission constraint in the mesh 
network would increase the market price. The study also showed 
that divestiture action does not always increase the social 
welfare, even in the case of efficiency improvement. Genc and 
Reynolds (2011) incorporated the capacity constraint in the 
supply function in the global convex formulation. The research 
1 See B. E. Hobbs (2001) and Tanaka (2009) for examples of the first 
approach, while B.F. Hobbs, Metzler, and Pang (2000),  Borenstein, 
Bushnell, and Stoft (2000) and Cunningham, Baldick, and Baughman 
(2002) give insights on the second method.
Hakam: Market Power Modelling in Electricity Market: A Critical Review
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 5 • 2018350
finding provided an interlink between capacity production and 
sets of supply function equilibrium to show the unilateral effect 
from the pivotal player in the market due to power generation 
constraints from the rival players. Petoussis et al. (2013a, 
2013b) analysed the parameterisation of firm behaviour in an 
Alternative Current (AC) SFE model. The SFE model assumed 
that the players could perform market power exercise through 
the gaming of supply bidding function, e.g. change in slope, 
intercept and supply-intercept. Petoussis et al. (2013a, 2013b) 
found that different parameterisation of supply bids resulted in a 
similar equilibrium point for non-congestion transmission lines. 
However, as the constrained transmission is at a low level, the 
intercept parameterisation deviates from other equilibriums. While 
in high level constrained transmission lines, the slope-intercept 
parameterisation is dissimilar from the rest of the supply bid 
parameters. Brandts et al. (2014) related the market power index 
(RSI) with SFE and the Multi-Unit Auction model by using a 
market power experiment to study supply function competition 
in the electricity market. This study provided evidence from a 
laboratory experiment on the effects of pivotal players in the 
electricity market and then linked the analysis of the experimental 
result to RSI as the market power index.
3. MARKET POWER INDICES IN 
ELECTRICITY MARKET
Market Share and HHI is a standard market power index. Market 
designers have applied these indexes to analyse market structure 
for many decades. It is a simple version of market power 
assessment since the formulation only requires sales or capacity 
data. A market share concentration ratio measures the supplier 
concentration in the market by dividing the producer share with 
the market share of the largest n companies in the industry. In the 
electricity market, firstly, several electricity market characteristics 
should be defined, e.g. energy production, energy plus reserve, 
short-term capacity and long-term capacity. The trigger level for 
market share is 20%. The difficulty of this index is in determining 
the appropriate geographic region, e.g. Small but Significant and 
Non-Transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP) test, and the Hub-and-
Spoke test. The Market Share index also ignores many power 
system factors including demand side, strategic incentives and 
often congestion issues. Hence, an electricity market entails time 
dimension and geographical boundary differentiation (Newbery 
et al., 2004).
Two traditional approaches have been introduced based on the 
Market Share index. The first approach is SSNIP test while the 
second is the “hub and spoke” approach. The SSNIP test examines 
whether the price could increase if all of the generator firms in a 
specific area merged into a single company. The “Law of one price” 
defines a market as a geographic area where similar commodities 
are sold at the same price ignoring transmission losses. Introduced 
by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the 
“Hub and Spoke” approach was where market size was defined 
as the total capacity controlled by the firm plus all of the utilities 
directly interconnected with that firm and ignoring transmission 
constraints. FERC introduced a trigger level of 20% of the market 
share. However, there are other cases where the thresholds lie 
above 20%, i.e., European case law and the Dutch Competition 
Company set the trigger level at 25% and 30%, respectively 
(Newbery et al., 2004).
The drawback of the Market Share index is that firms with the 
same market share could have different market power exercise 
depending on the characteristics of the market (e.g. the number 
of companies, the rank of companies in the market). HHI covers 
this issue by determining the sum of the squares market share of 
all companies in the market.
HHI S S Sn= + + +1
2
2
2 2...              Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (1)
Where Si is the market share percentage of firm i. If the trigger 
level for HHI is below 1,000, then the region is unconcentrated; 
if the HHI level is between 1,000 and 1,800 then the region is 
concentrated; thus, a HHI level higher than 1,800 will result in a 
highly concentrated region (Newbery et al., 2004; FTC and DOJ, 
1992). The revision of the US Merger Guidelines revised the 
theoretical limit for market concentration: HHI below 1,500 for 
unconcentrated, HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 for concentrated, 
and above 2,500 for highly concentrated (Shapiro, 2010; FTC 
and DOJ, 2010).
Several market power studies on electricity markets applied 
HHI as a tool to mitigate market competitiveness, e.g. Küpper 
et al. (2008) in the Belgian market; Hellmer and Linda (2009) 
in the Nordic market; Asgari and Monsef (2010) in the Iranian 
market; Shukla and Ashok (2011) in the India electricity 
market. These studies acknowledged the limitation of HHI 
in its static behaviour in measuring market power. Therefore, 
these mitigation studies incorporated other tools, e.g. the 
pivotal supplier index (PSI), LI and RSI. The critic of the HHI 
application is the reliability for measuring dynamic markets 
such as electricity market. HHI ignores the transmission flow, 
cable constraint, and forward contract, yet these factors affect 
market concentration. The primary drawback of HHI, and also 
market share, is that a firm with a small market share of <10% 
could perform market power exercise and become pivotal, i.e., in 
peak load conditions. During the California crisis, no company 
in the market owned a market share of more than 20% (Sheffrin 
2001). Thus, other methods such as PSI and RSI take place to 
mitigate real-time activities.
Electricity market monitoring agencies still apply a traditional 
market index to measure the competitiveness of electricity markets, 
i.e., application of HHI in the New England Independent System 
Operator (NEISO) market monitoring reports.2 According to 
NEISO (2016, 23), the result of structural competitiveness analysis 
in New England is that the system-wide concentration remains low, 
i.e., the HHIs for the past nine seasons ranged from 706 in Winter 
2014 to 835 in Winter 2016, although NEISO acknowledged in 
their report that market power still exists during certain system 
condition. Therefore, NEISO applies a set of mitigation rules3 to 
2 See http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2016/05/q1_
winter_2016_qmr_final.pdf for the latest quarterly NEISO report.
3 In the quarterly report, NEISO did not explain further regarding this suite 
of mitigating rules.
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mitigate the effect of market power exercise in the spot and forward 
market. Modelling electricity market using classical market power 
index, i.e., HHI, will not fully describing the real interaction of a 
power system. Thus, a reliable market power index must be applied 
to model the uniqueness of electricty market.
The PSI incorporates not only supply capacity but also demand 
conditions, thus overcoming the drawback in market supply 
and HHI. Here, the firm is considered as pivotal if the index is 
one, where the GenCo is dispatched to meet the total demand. 
Otherwise, the generation system is at a shortage condition. 
However, if the firm is considered as non-pivotal if the index is 
zero, electricity demand could be satisfied using the output from 
other generators alone. Binary value determination in the PSI 
from each hour then aggregated in a particular period is used to 
calculate time percentage where the firm is pivotal:
PSI=I(Q-KT+Ki)                     PSI function (2)
Q= electricity demand; is metred load plus purchased ancillary 
services
Ki= generation capacity minus contract obligation of firm 
KT= total generation capacity in the market plus total net imports
RSI is an equivalent concept to the PSI, but rather than using a 
binary scale, RSI uses a continuous scale. Thus, the continuous 
scale application overcomes the critique in the PSI, i.e., the 
company that has market power exercise ability, but is not 
pivotal:
r
k k
Q
i
T
i=
−
                            RSI function (3)
When RSI is >100%, the firm has little influence on the market. 
On the contrary, if RSI is <100%, the firm generation output is 
needed to satisfy the demand, and therefore, firm is categorised 
as a pivotal player in the market. The PSI is the indicator function 
applied to 1 minus the RSI:
PSI I Q k k
I
k k
Q
I r
i
T
i
T
i
i
= − −( )
= −
−




 = −1 1( )
     Relationship between RSI  
                                                     and PSI function
The traditional measure of market power is HHI, but the index 
is not suitable for electricity markets with low elasticity demand. 
Thus, RSI is considered a more reliable market power index in the 
wholesale electricity market, especially in the California electricity 
market (Sheffrin 2001, 2002; Rahimi and Anjali 2003) and Europe 
(London Economics 2007; Newbery 2009; Swinand et al., 2010). 
CAISO developed the RSI method and demonstrated the linkage 
between hourly RSI with PCM. Sheffrin (2001) showed that RSI 
averaged at 120% followed by a nearly competitive market price 
benchmark. RSI could also be utilised to find the advantages in 
TEP, i.e., the power import using transmission lines caused RSI 
to increase and the market price to reduce. Also, the power system 
operator could test the reserve margin level to meet the competitive 
market condition. The rule regarding RSI based on Sheffrin (2002) 
is to make sure that RSI is <120% for more than 5% of the hours 
in a year, and vice versa.
The EU Commission DG Competition conducted a competition 
and market power study on the EU electricity market in 2005-
2007 on six of the EU’s big electricity markets covering Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK. Published 
by London Economics (2007), the study used regression analysis 
and showed the relationship between market structure and market 
outcomes, which permitted the empirical examination of the 
market power of the largest company in the network. This showed 
that the largest company in the network played a significant role 
in determining price in the EU electricity market. The study also 
suggested that ex-ante competition analysis in the electricity 
sector, e.g. merger and acquisition and divestiture effects, could 
apply RSI as the market power index. Newbery (2009) extended 
the London Economics (2007) study by including forward 
contracting and capacity constraints on the Cournot model, 
then re-derived the formulation and found that the model is 
more suitable for electricity markets with a single pivotal player 
(Dutch power system). However, the model seems to fit markets 
with more than one pivotal player (German and Spain). Thus, 
expanding the model to include more than one pivotal player 
was suggested.
RSI is evolving as a suitable and reliable market power index in 
European countries. Using ex-post data in the ex-ante analysis, 
Mulder and Lambert (2013) performed competition to study the 
Dutch electricity market on the effect of the firm level (merger 
and acquisition, changing generation portfolio), market-
integration events (market coupling and netting) and demand 
events on competition levels by using the decomposition 
method of RSI. Since there are no merger and acquisition 
events in the Dutch electricity market during the period 2006-
2011, the firm-level events did not significantly influence the 
competition level in the market. Also, in that period, there 
were relatively low changes in the generation portfolio. 
Market integration events, e.g. market coupling and netting, 
seems to have had a similar impact on the competition level 
with generation or transmission expansion events. Moreover, 
the change in residual demand due to the European economic 
crisis influenced the number of pivotal generation companies 
in the region. Hence, demand events are as equally important 
as market integration events.
A similar approach in ex-ante analysis considering transmission 
constraint, the so-called transmission-constrained residual supply 
index, was studied by Lee et al. (2011). The study argued that basic 
RSI formula ignored the influence of transmission constraint. As 
such, it is not suitable for electricity market modelling considering 
the existence of locational marginal prices with transmission 
constraints. Thus, an ad-hoc market power analysis for each power 
plant incorporating simple linear programming was conducted 
to measure the extent of generation supply to meet demand with 
transmission congestion. The linear programming function is 
to minimise the market power by maximizing RF. The index is 
calculated hourly only during peak periods since transmission 
congestions primarily arise during peak demand times. The 
 (4)
Hakam: Market Power Modelling in Electricity Market: A Critical Review
International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy | Vol 8 • Issue 5 • 2018352
TRSI is useful in analysing bottleneck transmission line points. 
Thus, TRSI application is helpful for power system planners to 
perform TEP.
4. MARKET POWER INDEX 
APPLICATION IN COMPETITION POLICY 
ENFORCEMENT
Anticompetitive mergers are different from other anti-competitive 
actions such as cartel and collusion. Analysing anticompetitive 
mergers requires ex-ante method rather than ex-post method. 
Merger Guidelines should forecast the merger activity and analyse 
the impact on the market price if a merger proposal is allowed. 
The fundamental problem with an anticompetitive merger is 
that the market price increases and consumer welfare decrease 
due to the output reduction from combining companies. The 
non-merging players respond to this action by increasing their 
production. The system could not avoid the adverse effects since 
the dispatch growth has weaker effects than output reduction, 
therefore the horizontal merger does not create synergies raising 
the price (Farrell and Shapiro 1990). However, Farrell and Shapiro 
(1990) showed that the traditional merger analysis under HHI 
could be misleading.
The US Department of Justice (DOJ) analyses merger cases based 
on the framework derived from the 2010 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (HMG). According to the DOJ, the primary goals of 
the 2010 HMG is “…to help the agencies identify and challenge 
competitively harmful mergers while avoiding unnecessary 
interference with mergers that either are competitively beneficial 
or likely will have no competitive impact on the marketplace”4. The 
HMG defines two types of merger effects in competition policy 
(FTC and DOJ 2010), i.e., coordinated and unilateral effect. The 
coordinated effect occurred due to firms in the industry performing 
a merger by engaging some coordination in increasing price and 
decrease competition. In contrast, the unilateral effect resulted 
from the merger process without coordination between firms in 
the industry. The DOJ determined the anticompetitive effects by 
analysing the post-merger concentration and applying HHI as 
market power index.5 A Higher HHI of post-merger indicates a 
higher concentration in the market structure which more likely 
lead to anticompetitive effects.6
The Horizontal Merger Guidelines (HMG) year 2010 has different 
approaches in analysing the merger process compare to the 
HMG year 1992 (See FTC and DOJ (1992, 2010)). The 2010 
guidelines use a variety of tools, instead of a single method, in 
analysing competition. The 2010 guidelines also introduced an 
4 Press Release, Department of Justice (Aug. 19, 2010). Available at https://
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/261642.pdf.
5 Although market concentration is considered as a traditional measurement 
in calculating market power index, market concentration is a trivial and 
useful indicator as a preview in analysing the market structure.
6 FTC and DOJ (2010, 19) expressly states that “The higher the post-merger 
HHI and the increase in the HHI, the greater are the Agencies’ potential 
competitive concerns and the greater is the likelihood that the Agencies will 
request additional information to conduct their analysis”.
“Evidence of Adverse Competitive Effects” section where the 
agencies discussed the source of evidence that is informative in 
predicting the merger effects on competition. The 2010 guidelines 
expanded the discussion on unilateral and coordinated effects, 
and provided a discussion on agencies evaluation on determining 
the degree of market power where entry is considered easy (FTC 
and DOJ 2010; Shapiro 2010). The 2010 guideline also updated 
the concentration threshold that determined what level of market 
power index agencies should use to conduct an investigation (FTC 
and DOJ 2010). Merger guidelines in HMG 1982 was applied by 
establishing rules on post-merger and Delta HHI thresholds. The 
revision of section 5 of the Merger Guidelines in 2010 stated that 
Market Participants, Market Shares and Market Concentration 
retain the usage of the HHI threshold (Shapiro 2010).
An antitrust agency, i.e., the DOJ, has several key considerations 
for analysing the competitiveness of merger action in electricity 
generation markets. First criteria are market boundaries/
definitions which are determined by the power system network and 
geographical limitations. The way for antitrust agencies to define a 
relevant geographic market and power system boundaries affects 
the nominal of generation and demand faced by particular GenCos. 
For example, in the case of the proposed acquisition of PSEG by 
Exelon in 2006, the post-merger company would account for more 
than 35% in the area of central and eastern Pennsylvania, New 
Jersey, Delaware, the District of Columbia, and parts of Columbia 
(PJM Central/East). In another area, i.e., Northern New Jersey and 
Philadelphia areas (PJM East), the post-merger Company would 
account for more than 45% of the total generating system of this 
area. It is important to note that the PJM power system network,7 
i.e., the transmission network and congestions8 of PJM, determined 
the market boundaries and definition.
The PJM East boundaries are defined by the “Eastern Interface” 
which is identified by five extra high voltage (EHV) transmission 
lines that separate the New Jersey and Philadelphia subsystem 
from the main PJM power system. Any congestion in the “Eastern 
Interface” in peak load condition will result in PJM dispatchers to 
generate electricity from power plants in the PJM East area, thus 
resulting in higher electricity prices in the East compared to the 
west of the interface. In contrast, PJM Central/East boundaries 
are characterised by two EHV transmission lines from western 
and central Pennsylvania. The two major transmission lines 
separate the PJM Central/East from the PJM main power system. 
If congested, the PJM will call for additional generation from 
the East area of the interface, thus resulting in higher electricity 
prices in the East area of the interface compared to the West area.
The power system is developed according to transmission and 
generation expansion planning. The development of a transmission 
7 PJM is the largest transmission grid operator in the United States that 
providing electricity to approximately more than 51 million people (year 
2006) in PJM interconnection area (Federal Register 2006).
8 For a detailed explanation see (Federal Register 2006). Interregional data 
map of PJM could be seen at http://www.pjm.com/markets-and-operations/
interregional-map.aspx. Power system operation of PJM including power 
transfer and limit could be seen at http://www.pjm.com/pub/operations/
reactive-transfers/2016-flows.xls.
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network, i.e., building and upgrading transmission lines, eliminates 
transmission congestion and reduces the constrained area. In the 
case of the proposed acquisition of Constellation Energy Group, 
Inc. by Exelon in 2011, the DOJ defined PJM Mid-Atlantic North 
as a constrained area bounded by the Keystone-Juniata 5004 
and the Conemaugh-Juniata 5005 transmission line. PJM Mid-
Atlantic North is a constrained area that includes the populated 
areas of eastern Pennsylvania, eastern Maryland, Delaware, 
and the District of Columbia. A second constrained area is PJM 
Mid-Atlantic South that includes eastern Pennsylvania, eastern 
Maryland, District of Columbia, Delaware and Virginia. The 
power system interface affecting PJM Mid-Atlantic South is the 
AP South Interface which includes Mt. Storm - Doubs 512 line, 
the Mt. Storm - Meadowbrook line, Mt. Storm - Valley 550 line, 
and the Greenland Gap - Meadowbrook 540 line (Federal Register 
2011). Thus, based on Section 7 of the Clayton Act,9 the DOJ 
defines PJM Mid-Atlantic North and PJM Mid-Atlantic South as 
a relevant geographic market.
The second criteria is the nominal of HHI post-merger to determine 
market concentration. In PJM East, the Exelon and PSEG merger 
case in 2006 would yield a post-merger HHI more than 2,700 with 
delta HHI more than 1,100. In PJM Central/East, the post-merger 
HHI is approximately 2,100 with Delta HHI approximately 800. 
According to the US Merger Guidelines 1992, post-merger of more 
than 1,800 with Delta HHI more than 100 indicates the urgency 
of investigation from antitrust agencies. In another merger case 
in 2011, the post-merger company of Exelon and Constellation 
had a post-merger of HHI of 1,600 with an increase in HHI of 
almost 400 in PJM Mid-Atlantic North.10 In the PJM Mid-Atlantic 
South post-merger company,11 HHI was 1,800 with Delta HHI 
approximately 250. According to the revised Merger Guidelines 
2010, the HHI post-merger between 1,500 and 2,500 with Delta 
HHI above 100 potentially raises significant competitive concerns 
and often warrant scrutiny (FTC and DOJ 2010).
Table 1 shows the threshold of market concentration using HHI 
applied by the European Commission (EC Merger Guidelines) 
and US Antitrust agencies (US HMG).
The third consideration of antitrust agencies in analysing 
anticompetitive behaviour in the power generation market is the 
post-merger power generation system/portfolio.12 Post-merger 
generation system/portfolio refers to the balance of ownership 
in generation technologies, i.e., peaking, intermediate and 
9 Section 7 application of the Clayton Act requires a determination of 
definition in the product and geographic dimensions of the relevant market.
10 Exelon owns 18% of the total generating capacity in the PJM Mid-Atlantic 
North subsystem while Constellation owns 100% of the total power 
generation in the PJM Mid-Atlantic North subsystem.
11 The total generation capacity of Exelon in the PJM Mid-Atlantic South 
subsystem is approximately 14% while Constellation accounts for 9% of 
the PJM Mid-Atlantic South total generation.
12 Except one or more of the following factors present (European Commission 
2004): 1. A potential/recent entrant with a small market share; 2. Merging 
parties are important not reflected in market share; 3. Significant cross-
shareholdings; 4. Merging firms are maverick firms; 5. Past or on-going 
coordination; 6. One of the merging parties has 50% or more pre-merger 
market share.
baseload Power Plant. A GenCo could have a tolerable market 
power calculated from the total installed capacity but have high-
level market power in a particular generation technology, for 
example, a GenCo A with a generation capacity of 1,000 MW 
peaking power plant. Total power plant capacity in the power 
system is 10,000 MW, consisting of 1,000 MW peaking PP, 3,000 
MW intermediate PP, and 6,000 MW baseload PP. From a total 
generation perspective, GenCo A only has 10% of market share. 
However, from the peak load system perspective, GenCo A has 
100% of market share that gives the company the ability to raise 
electricity prices under peak load conditions.
Looking at the Exelon and PSEG merger case in 2006, the DOJ 
concluded that there are anticompetitive effects in the merger 
action by analysing the post-merger generation portfolios. The 
merger action increased the market share of mid-merit and peaking 
capacity. Thus, Exelon could increase the electricity price by 
bidding high auctions to the PJM so that PJM would not call the 
bid which resulted in a higher market clearing price. The merger 
action also increased the market share of baseload and mid-merit 
capacity in PJM East and PJM Central/East. The post-merger 
GenCo could withhold the output of baseload PP and then raise 
the market clearing price (Federal Register 2006). The DOJ also 
concluded the existence of anticompetitive effects in the Exelon 
and Constellation merger in 2011 by examining the ability of the 
post-merger company to raise the price by withholding the output 
of high cost and low cost generating unit in PJM Mid-Atlantic 
North and PJM Mid-Atlantic South (Federal Register 2011).
The DOJ concluded that the merger between Exelon and PSEG 
conducted on December 20, 2004, and between Exelon and 
Constellation on April 28, 2011, would substantially lessen 
competition in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 14 U.S.C. 
18. Therefore, the proposed final judgement of Exelon-PSEG and 
Exelon-Constellation merger was to order the divestiture of assets13 
within 150 days after the merger transaction. The divestiture of 
mid-merit and peaking PP as a proposed judgement in the Exelon-
PSEG merger reduced the market concentration of the post-
merger company from 49% to 32% in PJM East, and from 40% 
to 29% in PJM Central/East. After the divestiture, the generation 
capacity of Exelon still provides an incentive to exercise market 
by withholding output especially from low-cost PP, i.e., Nuclear 
PP. However, the divestiture of six units of mid-merit and peaking 
PP substantially limits Exelon’s ability to withhold output (Federal 
Register 2006). In the Exelon-Constellation merger case, although 
the proposed final judgement ordered the post-merger company 
to divest the three baseload PP, this does not merely restore the 
market share and HHI to the merger level. However, the divestiture 
assures that the merger is not likely to lead to consumer detriment 
(Federal Register 2011).
13 Many scholars also expressly emphasise the importance of generation 
system/portfolio related to the ability of a generation company to raise the 
electricity price, e.g. (Green 1996; Wolfram 1999; Green and Newbery 
1992) in England and Wales Market, (Diaconu, Oprescu, and Pittman 
2009) in Romanian electricity market, and (Tanaka 2009; Pollitt 2004; 
Arellano 2003) in the Chilean electricity market. However, these studies 
were more focused in the post-divestiture of GenCo.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The success of electricity market design depends not only on our 
understanding of the general principle of economics but also on 
how we apply the knowledge in microeconomic engineering. 
The economists’ role is not only to analyse the market but also 
to design them. However, instead of enforcing the competition 
legislation and institutions, it is not often that politicians and 
lawyers take the first step in designing the market and are deeply 
involved in the market creation. The electricity market is one 
example of a market where economists play a major role in the 
market model, apart from designing labour clearinghouses and 
auctions (Roth 2002). In the context of the electricity market, 
economists need to consider the electricity market structure and 
the complications in detail, and not just the principal features, 
to achieve optimal configuration and maximum welfare for 
society. Therefore, an engineering insight is substantial rather 
than incorporating simple conceptual models into the specific 
working of the market.
Electricity market modellers widely use the Cournot setting 
due to its tractability and compatibility with power system 
characteristics, e.g. generation and transmission constraints, 
voltage and stability condition, generation ramp-up and ramp-
down, contingency analysis and commodity flow PTDF. It is 
convenient to incorporate forward contracting to a large scale 
Cournot power system. Forward contracting reduces the ability 
of pivotal players to exercise market power (Willems, 2002). 
Thus, forward contracting could help the model to become 
more realistic (Willems et al., 2009). The criticism regarding 
Cournot modelling is that the model is relatively inaccurate 
in representing the electricity market due to the high value of 
demand elasticity. On the one hand, in an electricity industry 
where the elasticity demand is relatively inelastic, the equilibrium 
price is too high and the output is too low. On the other hand, 
SFE modelling also contains weaknesses since the model 
could produce several market equilibriums, which is relatively 
difficult to calculate compared to Cournot modelling, which 
needs simplification in the market structures. Thus, in the end, 
the analysis of the electricity market should provide a tractable 
analysis which Cournot model is the most suitable for applying 
in the electricity market.
Electricity market designers have learned from two-decades 
of experience that one of the most significant problems in the 
wholesale electricity market post-restructuring process is the 
so-called market power which is the capability of the successor 
companies (companies exist after restructuration) to increase 
the price above the market price. It is not possible to eliminate 
market power completely since market power brings positive 
investment signals to investors. However, market power could 
be mitigated and assessed using a specific method. Market power 
assessment is a significant effort to avoid the adverse effects 
from generating firm strategic action. Hence, it could detect 
and prevent excessive deviations of prices from competitive 
levels. Also, it has the capability to guide market design choice. 
An ideal market power index is one which provides the most 
straightforward number to measure the market power exercise. 
However, a more sophisticated approach is needed to mitigate 
market power since traditional indexes have limitations in 
representing the complexity of the power system. Economist 
tends to minimise market power ex-ante rather than ex-post 
by using market power indexes such as the Price Cost Markup 
(PCM), Lerner Index (LI) or RSI, i.e., forecasting how the 
divestiture and merger action could affect the market price and 
using the analysis to make a decision.
Table 1: EC and US Merger Guidelines applying HHI threshold
Guidelines HHI Post merger ∆HHI Analysis
EC Merger Guidelines HHIpost<1000 Unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns. Does 
not require extensive analysis.
1000<HHIpost<2000 ∆HHI<250 Unlikely to identify horizontal competition concerns.
12 
HHIpost<2000 ∆HHI<150
HHIpost<2000 ∆HHI<250 Investigation required.
US 1992 HMG HHIpost<1000 Mergers are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects. 
Requires no further analysis.1000<HHIpost<1800 ∆HHI<100
1000<HHIpost<1800 ∆HHI<100 Potentially raises significant competitive concerns.
HHIpost>1800 ∆HHI<50 Mergers are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects. 
Ordinarily requires no further analysis.
HHIpost>1800 50<∆HHI<100 Potentially raises significant competitive concerns.
HHIpost>1800 ∆HHI<100 Likely to create market power or facilitate market power 
exercise.
US 2010 HMG HHIpost>1800 ∆HHI<100 Mergers are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects. 
Ordinarily requires no further analysis.1500<HHIpost<2500
1500<HHIpost<2500 ∆HHI<100 Potentially raises significant competitive concerns and 
often warrants scrutiny.
HHIpost>2500 ∆HHI<100 Mergers are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects. 
Ordinarily requires no further analysis.
HHIpost>2500 100<∆HHI<200 Potentially raises significant competitive concerns and 
often warrants scrutiny.
HHIpost>2500 ∆HHI<200 Likely to enhance market power.
Source: FTC., DOJ. (1992), Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FTC., DOJ. (2010), Horizontal Merger Guidelines, European Commission (2004)
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